What to expect in South Korea’s June 3 snap election
The next president faces the tough job of bolstering South Korea’s democracy as well as its economy.
EUN A JO
On June 3, 2025, South Korea will hold a snap presidential election, following the removal of President Yoon Suk Yeol from office after his self-coup attempt in December 2024. Yoon’s ouster has deepened political divisions and further radicalized the country’s right. Lee Jae-myung, leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), is currently polling at 51% and remains the favorite. But his path to victory may owe more to the lack of a credible alternative than to any broad popular mandate.
Whoever wins the June 3 election will inherit a complex web of challenges that threaten the country’s long-term stability. Domestically, South Korea is struggling with economic stagnationand a fraying social safety net – problems that will only worsen as the population shrinks and ages. Successive governments have failed to address rising inequality, leaving many citizens disillusioned and drawn to radical alternatives. On the global stage, South Korea remains caught up in a volatile geopolitical landscape, balancing tensions with North Korea, China, and the United States. Tackling these challenges – and mitigating the recent political upheaval – will be a tall order for any president.
Who are the top contenders?
In addition to Lee, the DPK leader, the other top contender in the upcoming presidential election is Kim Moon-soo of the ruling People Power Party (PPP). Lee and Kim stand on opposite sides of the political divide following Yoon’s martial law debacle. Lee gained global fame by livestreaming on his way to the National Assembly to block the martial law declaration on the night of Dec. 3, 2024. Kim, a Yoon loyalist, became a conservative icon for refusing to stand and apologizewhen the rest of Yoon’s cabinet bowed in unison during a legislative session.
Both candidates have faced recent controversy. On May 1, an appellate court overturned Lee’s previous acquittal on charges of violating election laws, casting doubt on his eligibility to run for presidency. And Lee faces four other criminal indictments, including a charge related to unlawful money transfers to North Korea – all of which he firmly denies. Meanwhile, senior figures within the ruling PPP attempted to replace Kim with Han Duk-soo, the acting president, as the party’s candidate despite Kim’s victory in the primary. Kim withstood the pressure, but the episode exposed a lack of internal party support for his campaign.
What should we expect?
South Korean politics have long been shaped by debates over national identity – a legacy of the Cold War. The June 2025 election is no exception. The two leading candidates embody competing visions for the country’s place in the world. Lee, following the progressive tradition, envisions a pragmatic South Korea and favors a “balanced” foreign policy that cautions against overreliance on Washington. Kim, in the conservative mold, champions a global South Koreaanchored in a tougher posture toward North Korea and stronger ties to the United States and Japan. Geopolitical realities have often tempered these orientations for South Korea’s foreign policy, but the two views continue to persist as markers of partisan identity.
These competing worldviews also inform the candidates’ domestic policy agendas. On national security, Lee wants to bolster South Korea’s indigenous defense capabilities and expand ties to the Global South. Kim, in contrast, hopes to strengthen the country’s deterrence capabilities through the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. On the economy, Lee advocates for government-led development with a focus on high-tech and content industries. Kim, on the other hand, calls for sweeping tax cuts and broad deregulation to stimulate private-sector growth. On institutional reform, Lee supports improving legislative accountability through a “recall” system – which would allow citizens to vote to remove ineffective lawmakers – and strengthening the judiciary. Kim seeks instead to abolish oversight bodies like the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials, which previously investigated Yoon.
What can we hope for?
Beyond their different policy priorities, however, lies the bigger question of how to restore South Korea’s democratic integrity. Many South Koreans see this as a priority that demands a long-overdue institutional overhaul.
South Korea’s democracy has sharply eroded in recent years. During his term in office, Yoon centralized power by appointing his allies – however controversial – to top posts in government. He also targeted the media by weaponizing defamation suits against reporters and financially choking critical news outlets. Under his watch, South Korea dropped to 62nd in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index, down from 42nd place in 2021 under President Moon Jae-in’s leadership. These developments reflected a broader pattern of democratic backsliding. South Korea’s liberal democracy index (see figure) has now fallen to levels comparable with those during the Park Geun-hye era – another president ousted for abuses of power.
It is unsurprising, then, that at the heart of the debate over the democratic crisis is the question of how to rein in presidential power. Lee has put forward a sweeping proposal: Replace the single five-year term with a two-term, four-year presidency to encourage responsible governance; and introduce a runoff voting system to ensure majority support. Kim has expressed conditional support, advocating for shortening the next presidential term from five to three years to ease the transition, and ending presidential immunity from prosecution. With growing public demandfor a constitutional solution, this could be a rare opportunity to restructure South Korea’s political system.
Yet, public appetite for constitutional updates has not always translated into meaningful change. Moon Jae-in’s presidency serves as a cautionary example. Elected in the wake of Park Geun-hye’s impeachment in 2017, Moon entered office with a broad mandate for change and enacted several anti-corruption measures to bolster government accountability. But his reliance on administrative powers to push his agenda without legislative compromise drew criticisms of executive overreach. As a result, even as South Korea’s democratic performance recovered to pre-2008 levels under his leadership, many blamed Moon for the country’s deepening political polarization.
This recent history suggests that how leaders pursue political change may matter as much as what is on their agenda. South Korea’s next president would be advised to resist the temptation to govern unilaterally. Along similar lines, the opposition would do well to curb its obstructionist impulses. Without such mutual restraint, even the most well-intentioned efforts toward structural change – even those that, in principle, enjoy bipartisan support – can falter.
Eun A Jo is a 2025-2026 Good Authority fellow.